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HUA-YEN Buddhism, the pre-eminent philosophical form of Bud­dhism in early T’ang dynasty China, was instrumental in laying the con­
ceptual foundations for virtually all subsequent East Asian Buddhism. This 
Hua-yen legacy includes Ch’an/Zen and Pure Land, the non-philosophical 
forms of Buddhism that came to dominance in the centuries to follow. In this 
sense, Fa-tsang (643-712), the third patriarch and foremost philosopher 
of Hua-yen, can be considered one of the forefathers of East Asian Bud­
dhism today.1 By focusing on one element in Fa-tsang’s thought, this essay 
attempts to articulate the overall character of Hua-yen thought and, in the 
process, to shed light on its connection to other dimensions of the Buddhist 
tradition.
1 Fa-tsang, although the third patriarch in the Hua-yen lineage, was the first philosopher 
focused on the Hua-yen Sutra to bring that text to prominence in China. He served as National 
Teacher under Empress Wu, a position from which his fame and influence spread.
2 Wu-chiao chang (T 45, no. 1866) is Fa-tsang’s effort to survey the vast collection of 
Buddhist texts and ideas in order to place them into an understandable order. His “classifica­
tion of the teachings” (p ’an-chiao fl®) shows extraordinary sophistication and wide-ranging 
knowledge of the history of Buddhism, and attempts to demonstrate at that time which parts 
of this overwhelming tradition were most worthy of study and meditation.
In Fa-tsang’s monumental Wu-chiao chang (Treatise on the Five
Teachings'),1 2- the mental image of a house is taken to model the dharmakaya 
universe as a whole. On Fa-tsang’s account, since any one part of the house 
—his example is a rafter—is a condition for the house as a whole, that one 
part through its complex relations encompasses the whole house and is 
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therefore able to reveal it comprehensively. What he calls the “one flavor” of 
the dharmakdya can be fully tasted in any one part. Adopting Fa-tsang’s sys­
tematic principle and taking the concept of bodhicitta as the focal point of the 
study, this essay attempts to show the “one flavor” of Fa-tsang’s Buddhist 
thought through the treatment he gives to the traditional idea of the “thought 
of enlightenment.”
The concept bodhicitta comes up frequently in Fa-tsang’s voluminous 
writings. That, however, would not make it exceptional since, like Vasubandhu, 
his Indian Buddhist model, Fa-tsang works with the full historical repertoire 
of Buddhist concepts. And although bodhicitta warrants an entire text named 
in its honor—The Hua-yen Bodhicitta Treatise2,—one would still be over­
stating the case to claim that this is a central concept for Fa-tsang. 
Nevertheless, as promised by Fa-tsang, no matter which part, even down to 
a speck of dust in the entire universe, the character of the whole can be seen 
clearly in this bodhicitta component. Here’s how.
There is no question but that the most important claim that Fa-tsang makes 
about bodhicitta is that in the moment when the first thought or aspiration to 
bodhi arises, complete and perfect enlightenment has already been attained. 
For example, Fa-tsang writes: “In practicing the virtues, when one is per­
fected, all are perfected . . . and when one first arouses the ‘thought of 
enlightenment’ one also becomes perfectly enlightened.”3 4 This claim is 
unusual, of course, and counterintuitive because it overturns our expecta­
tions about all attainments of excellence—that they come after long and hard 
work, certainly not in the first serious thought or aspiration. So, on what 
basis has Fa-tsang made this claim about bodhicitta, and what does it mean?
3 Hua-yen fap’u-t'i hsin chang T 45, no.1878.
4 Wu-chiao chang, T 45, 507c.
Perhaps the best way to understand Fa-tsang’s point here is to resort back 
to his conceptual model of the house mentioned above. Bodhicitta would, in 
this analysis, belong to the entire quest for enlightenment as one of its many 
essential parts. The relevant claim for Fa-tsang is that all parts are identical 
in that they are all both empty (that is, dependent on something else) and 
serve as conditions for the whole being what it is. A rafter, Fa-tsang tells us, 
is like any part of the house in that, 1) it becomes a rafter only in relation to 
other parts and to the house as a whole and 2) that, without it, the house could 
not be what it is. This fact entails several further claims relevant to our con­
cern for bodhicitta'. that, as an essential condition for the house, the rafter
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possesses the power to create the entire house, and that therefore it stands in 
a relation of identity to the house as a whole.
Rather than examine Fa-tsang’s logic on these points, let us consider their 
extension to the concept of bodhicitta. The “thought of enlightenment” is 
indeed a condition of possibility for the enlightenment quest. Without this 
initial step, without an idea of what one is after and an earnest intention to 
seek it, there clearly would be no such outcome. But in what sense would the 
reverse be true? How would the first “thought of enlightenment” depend on 
the eventual outcome? How can something occurring now depend on some­
thing not yet in existence? The answer is that the former can depend on the 
latter only when the latter has come into being. When it has come into being, 
then both depend on each other to be exactly what they are in the specific 
sense that they are defined in relation to each other.
The temporal element in this sentence, indicated by the word “when,” is 
the key to Fa-tsang’s understanding of bodhicitta. Notice that the model of 
the house, and virtually all of Fa-tsang’s conceptual models, are static in 
structure, that is, time is not a component or a variable in the model. Fa-tsang 
has us examine the house and its components from the perspective of its 
completion, not in the stages of its construction. This is an important factor 
in understanding Hua-yen metaphysics. Fa-tsang responds to every narrative 
sequence such as the stages leading up to enlightenment by asking how it 
would appear from the perspective of the end of time. A piece of lumber 
becomes a rafter only when it is a part of a completed house; the part is made 
a part by the completed whole. Analogously, enlightenment is fully present 
in the initial “thought of enlightenment,” but only from the perspective of the 
completion of the journey.
The understanding of temporality that sets the stage for Fa-tsang’s bodhi­
citta doctrine is based on his understanding of the “emptiness of time,” to 
which we now turn. Fa-tsang lays the dimensions of time out in the same 
way that he does the parts of a house. Like the parts of any whole, a segment 
of time, for Fa-tsang, depends on all others, shapes all others, and, through 
their complex interpenetration, contains the whole of time within it. There­
fore, he writes: “Because an instant has no essence, it penetrates the eternal, 
and because the lengthy epochs have no essence, they are fully contained in 
a single instant . . . Therefore, in an instant of thought all elements of the 
three periods of time—past, present, and future—are fully revealed.”5 
5 Hua-yen ching i-haipai men SslKifStSiSST1], T 45, 630c.
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Taking the perspective of the end of time, Fa-tsang can operate the principle 
of dependent arising both forwards and backwards in time. Not only is the 
end dependent on the beginning but the beginning is dependent upon the end; 
both mutually define and contain each other. It is not just that the outcome of 
enlightenment depends on an initial “thought of enlightenment,” but also 
that the first moment of bodhicitta depends on the completion of the quest. 
Therefore, because perfect enlightenment is a cause or condition for the ini­
tial “thought of enlightenment,” that cause or condition is contained within it.
One reason why the logic of these arguments is frustrating is that Fa-tsang 
does not distinguish between the various senses of dependency. Wherever 
dependence, or any form of relation is present, Fa-tsang evokes all the lin­
guistic and logical traditions of “swrayata” and moves the argument forward 
from there. We can see the insightfulness in recognizing that something ear­
lier really does depend on something later: for example, the meaning of the 
assassination of Archduke Ferdinand is overwhelmingly determined by the 
fact that it led to a world war, just as the answer to “who was the Buddha?” 
is determined less by what happened in Northeast India in the 5th century 
BCE than by what happened all over Asia in the centuries to follow. But it 
seems crucial to us to recognize that the nature of this dependence is funda­
mentally different from the dependence of linear causation. The foundation 
of the house is a condition for the rafter in a sense that the rafter is not a con­
dition for the foundation. Whereas you cannot have a rafter without a foun­
dation to hold it up, you can have a foundation without a rafter, as in the case 
of a house that is framed but not yet roofed, or a house that never gets fin­
ished, or a house whose carpenter decides on a rafterless roof. Moreover, the 
hammer, the carpenter, and the farm that grows food for the carpenter are all 
conditions for the rafter, but each in different senses. So to declare them 
identical by virtue of their mutual dependence depends on two related 
moves: first, on conflating the various senses of dependency, and second, on 
understanding all components and all possible conditions as simultaneously 
present, that is, taking the perspective of final completion or the end of time.
So whereas in its traditional meaning bodhicitta entails a Buddhist theory 
of marga and the complexities of the path, Fa-tsang takes little interest in that 
meaning. The “thought of enlightenment” instead symbolizes, in the trope of 
irony, the sudden total presence of the completion of enlightenment even 
though in its initial point of departure. Precisely because the earlier tradition 
had conceived of bodhicitta as the true beginning of the path to enlighten­
ment, Fa-tsang is able to use that concept to make a startling, counterintuitive
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claim about the presence of enlightenment within, thereby directing our 
attention away from a linear stage theory toward a new understanding of 
what bodhi is.
One way to imagine the history of Buddhist thought up to and through the 
career of Fa-tsang is to consider it as a constant, impressive unfolding and 
enlargement of the concept of enlightenment. With every passing century, 
“enlightenment” in its various linguistic forms received a substantial up­
grade, new dimensions and further refinement being added to the ideal over 
time. It is as though this history were an application of something like 
Anselm’s ontological argument to the concept of enlightenment.6 Recall that 
Anselm’s rule for thinking the concept of divinity defines God as “that than 
which no greater could be thought.” Applied to the history of Buddhist 
enlightenment and the historical unfolding of ever new dimensions to that 
ideal, “enlightenment” seems to have functioned as that transcendent mode 
of being “than which no greater could be thought.” Any new Buddhist who, 
standing on the shoulders of his or her predecessors, could conceive of some­
thing greater in a cogent and persuasive way, extends and transforms the 
ideal; enlightenment is extended beyond its previous articulations, regardless 
of the inventor’s effort to attribute their innovation to a prior sutra or text. 
Although it takes a long time for cultures to notice this development as a 
process, from our historical point of view, this is what cultural ideals are: 
they are the most compelling image or conception that can be imagined at 
any given point in time, and are therefore continually pushed along by his­
torical impermanence.
6 Saint Anselm (1033-1 109) was the Archbishop of Canterbury in England and one of the 
greatest theologians in Christian history. In a text called the Proslogion, he developed what 
came to be called the ontological argument for the existence of God. This argument, which 
has been more influential in Christian theology as a rule for thinking the concept God than it 
has been as a proof, defines God as “that than which no greater can be thought.”
In India this development took an unusual form, or an unusually creative 
and exalted form, owing to the indigenous concept of rebirth. Idealizations in 
India did not need to conform to enlargements of human capacity imaginable 
in a person’s current lifetime. Indeed they could be projected far ahead of the 
present life by thousands or tens of thousands of evolutionary lives. While, 
from a Chinese point of view, this elevation of temporal perspective had a 
negative effect on the practical applicability of Indian ideals, it did serve as a 
catalyst for their imaginative character, and for the extension of metaphysi­
cal and ethical thinking into previously unencountered realms of reflection. 
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This is certainly no place to attempt to trace the history of this development, 
but just imagine for a moment the movement of the concept of nirvana from 
a state of an individual’s curtailed emotional suffering due to the conquest of 
desires and the emptying of self-interest, to a state pictured, for example, in 
the Gandhavyuha portion of the Hua-yen Sutra, where the ideal now 
includes grand visions of enormously complex and interpenetrating realms, 
other world systems imagined in vivid depth and detail, compassionate con­
cern for all sentient beings, even to the point of vowing to lead these virtual­
ly innumerable beings into this enlightened state of exaltation. And this 
transformation in goal in just over a half a millennium of Buddhist history!
When in the seventh century Fa-tsang was in a position to survey this 
magnificent ideal of enlightenment, the distance that must have been felt 
between any existing practitioner, no matter how advanced in Buddhist prac­
tice, and the way the goal was then conceptualized, must have been over­
whelming. Fa-tsang, therefore, faced a daunting challenge as a Buddhist 
philosopher, especially in the highly creative atmosphere of the early T’ang. 
In order to gather the Buddhist tradition together into its most exalted form, 
he had to ask himself what Anselm asked: what is the conception than which 
no greater could be thought? Here is Fa-tsang’s answer in a nutshell: 
“enlightenment” includes all of the above, that is, every admirable attribute, 
no matter how transcendent, that had accumulated in the Buddhist tradition 
up to that point, AND all of this is realizable right now, in this moment of this 
life, not thousands of lifetimes from now. Here is where we can see most 
clearly Fa-tsang’s motive for handling the bodhicitta teaching as he did. The 
serious thought of and aspiration for enlightenment is not simply a first step 
on an arduous path whose terminus you should not expect to glimpse for 
eons. Instead, Fa-tsang’s bodhicitta is a moment of liberating insight in 
which the end, and all the future leading up to it, is fully revealed.
Of the many Buddhist ideas that Fa-tsang drew up into his new system of 
Buddhist thought, three are especially germane to understanding how bodhi­
citta comes to receive the treatment that it does. First, Fa-tsang is well known 
for the eagerness with which he received the teaching of tathagatagarbha, 
the Indian and central Asian concept of the “womb of the Buddha,” or the 
embryo of enlightenment resident within all sentient beings. Although 
tathagatagarbha might be thought not to fit convincingly with Fa-tsang’s 
focus on sunyata, he nevertheless finds in this conception a perfect image to 
assist in bringing enlightenment nearer to the practitioner. Different texts, of 
course, stake out different conceptions of this teaching, based on different
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metaphors and different visual images. They cover a range from an image of 
enlightenment as an innate seed which would, if properly cultivated, eventu­
ate in a fully mature awakened bodhisattva, to an image of enlightenment not 
in the form of potential but rather in a state of full accomplishment.
Positioned as he was in Chinese Buddhist history, Fa-tsang leans toward 
the latter of these images, where enlightenment is the diamond discovered 
when the dust that obscures it is wiped away; it is eternally the same, does 
not need to grow and mature, and is radiantly present the moment even a sec­
tion of it comes to light. At this point it is easy to see why Fa-tsang’s p ’an- 
chicio classification scheme places the doctrine and texts of tathagatagarbha 
on top of those articulating other Mahayana themes like siinyata and 
vijnaptimdtrata: assuming, as Fa-tsang did, the applicability of emptiness to 
all things and the primary role of consciousness in the construction of human 
experience, he is simply more interested at that historical moment in how it 
is that all these exalted realizations can be expected to come to fruition in the 
life of a human being. They do so, he came to conclude, because they con­
stitute the innate structure of the tathdgata within, and come to fruition in the 
natural unfolding of this depth structure.
This is also why Fa-tsang takes an interest in the early Buddhist idea of 
“irreversibility,” the idea that at some point along the path the journey’s 
completion is assured. Characteristically, Fa-tsang placed this moment 
shockingly early in the process, earlier than Abhidharma masters might have 
thought useful for the purposes of incentive to practice. For Fa-tsang, bodhi­
citta is the moment when the tathagatagarbha shows itself, the moment 
when the diamond first comes to light and from which point on there is cer­
tainty of irreversible destiny.7 Bodhicitta therefore arises dependent on noth­
ing but the inner inevitable motion of the Buddha within all things.
7 Wu-chiao chang, T 45, 489b.
The second of the three factors that would have helped Fa-tsang shape the 
concept of bodhicitta as he did was the increasingly prevalent tendency in 
Chinese Buddhism to redescribe the enlightenment experience as sudden 
breakthrough. Since the sudden/gradual debate and its later development in 
the Ch’an school are so well known, I will not dwell on it here except to 
show how Fa-tsang weighs in on the issue and how it affects his placement 
of the “thought of enlightenment.” Suffice it to say that although Fa-tsang’s 
doctrine of sudden awakening is not and could not be as well developed con­
ceptually and practically as it came to be several generations later with the 
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Hua-yen masters Tsung-mi (780-841) and Li T’ung-hsuan (635 
[646]—730 [740]), or with the emergence in the eighth century of the Ch’an 
school, it is nevertheless essential to the way Fa-tsang conceives the charac­
ter of enlightenment. Words denoting an abrupt and sudden experiential 
transformation can be found throughout Fa-tsang’s treatises. And, beyond 
his Chinese predecessors, there was ample precedent in the Indian and 
Central Asian Buddhist tradition for the expectation of sudden revelation. No 
doubt foremost among Fa-tsang’s inspirations would have been segments in 
the Avatamsaka Sutra, the final Gandavyulia chapter in particular, where 
sudden insight typified the experience of the bodhisattva Sudhana in his jour­
ney through increasingly profound levels of realization. In classifying and 
ranking all Buddhist teachings, Fa-tsang would reserve the second highest 
level for those articulating doctrines of sudden breakthrough.
The third and last conceptual factor that set the stage for Fa-tsang’s treat­
ment of bodhicitta is the dichotomy that began to develop in Fa-tsang, and 
came to fruition in later Hua-yen and Ch’an, between yuan-ch’i or 
dependent arising and hsing-ch’i or nature arising. While Fa-tsang’s 
historical reputation as a philosopher of dependent arising is well deserved 
given the ubiquity and sophistication of pratltyasamutpada in his writings, 
the ultimate trajectory of Fa-tsang’s thought is away from the gradualism 
implied in linear dependency and toward the nonlinear abruptness of his con­
cept of Buddha-nature. The word hsing or “nature” is as central and as 
important a concept as you can find in the history of Chinese thought from 
Mencius’ propositions about human nature to the early and fateful transla­
tion of the Sanskrit svabhava into tzu-hsing §14, or “self-nature,” and be­
yond. Fa-tsang’s treatment of the concept hsing is merely a part in a much 
larger cultural whole. While Fa-tsang would continue throughout his career 
to teach the emptiness of self-nature, he would simultaneously elevate the 
overarching vision of emptiness as the “true nature” wherein hsing would 
attain identification with concepts of tathagata, dharmakaya, and other sym­
bols of non-empty ultimacy.
Therefore, we see in Fa-tsang an important reversal of images. Dependent 
arising had encouraged Buddhist practitioners in the earlier tradition to visu­
alize Buddhahood as the end product of an extended series of linear trans­
formations. What Fa-tsang had begun to imagine, from the nonlinear 
perspective of temporal interpenetration, was the explosive power within 
that drives this process from the outset. In this view bodhicitta is the 
“Buddha-nature” making itself known in the form of inevitability and irre-
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versibility, something pushing out from within rather than something even­
tually coming into actuality through causation. Rather than a result of matu­
ration, Buddhahood is its cause.
While later Hua-yen and Ch’an thinkers would set “dependent arising” 
and “nature-arising” in contrast to each other, Fa-tsang did not do so both 
because in his time the impetus to metaphysical doctrines of suddenness was 
not as strong as it would be later, and because his interest was in the “non­
obstruction” between these two Buddhist conceptions. “Nature-arising,” for 
Fa-tsang, could encompass “dependent arising,” without obstructing it. 
While all individual things arise dependent on others, from a more lofty per­
spective, this whole process of impermanent coming to be and passing away 
is the arising of just one thing—Buddha-nature.8 Therefore, he writes: “all 
arisings are simply the arising of the tathdgata”9 “There is nothing that does 
not arise from the dharmakaya and there is nothing that does not return to 
and become enlightened in the dharmakaya.”10 11
8 Hua-yen ching wen-ta T 45, 610b.
9 Wu-chiao chang, T 45, 497a.
10 Ibid., quoting the Mahayanasamgrahci, T 31,249.
11 Hua-yen fap 'u-t’i hsin chang, T 45, 653b.
For Fa-tsang these two apparently contradictory processes—dependent 
arising and nature arising—are simultaneously true, and wu-ai *51, non- 
obstnicting, because they operate at very different levels of intelligibility and 
can be experienced from different points of view. “When the dharmakaya 
circulates in the five destinies,” writes Fa-tsang, “it is experienced as sen­
tient beings. When sentient beings are seen, the dharmakaya does not 
appear.”11 The world of dependent arising, in all its complexity, is for Fa- 
tsang set within another all-encompassing narrative which gives the story a 
moral. This narrative—nature arising, or the tathagatagarbha—explains 
how the endless movement of complex, dependent particulars is all directed 
to the end of global insight. It is the story of the Buddha’s own continual cir­
culation through ignorance and enlightenment. For Fa-tsang, however, both 
levels of insight appear simultaneously, and their simultaneity, as we have 
seen, is predicated upon the extent to which he can picture himself both in 
time and standing outside of it. It is only on this basis that bodhicitta can be 
both an initial stage on the path to enlightenment and its complete and final 
accomplishment. Asserting “non-obstruction” between them, he writes: 
“The stages are not disturbed, yet they are mutually identified. Identity is not 
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disturbed, yet there always remains a sequence. Therefore these two con­
cepts are mutually inclusive and non-obstructing.”12
12 Wu-chiao chang, T 45, 490a.
13 Ibid., 482c.
Therefore, if we ask the question of Fa-tsang: Does enlightenment arise 
dependent on the particularities of Buddhist practice? We get a complex 
answer. Yes, says Fa-tsang, from one point of view insight is based on 
practice, and from the moment of bodhicitta on the practitioner moves 
through a sequence of dependent stages. On the other hand, Fa-tsang and 
much of the East Asian tradition after him were inclined to answer the ques­
tion in the negative: No, enlightenment does not arise dependent on practice 
since practice is simply the unfolding and outpouring of pre-existent enlight­
enment. Moreover, these two truths do not obstruct one another. It is not that 
“dependent arising” and “nature arising” constitute separate or dual reali­
ties; it is rather that one reality and one view encompasses the other. From 
Fa-tsang’s perspective, both the “small vehicle” view of bodhicitta as the 
beginning of a linear journey and the “great vehicle” view of bodhicitta as a 
complete experience of enlightenment are simultaneously true, the latter 
encompassing and upstaging the former. However, when Fa-tsang says that 
“there is no contradiction between simultaneity and sequence”13 it is impor­
tant to recognize that the point of view from which he can say that can only 
be higher order simultaneity, the perspective from which past, present, and 
future are completely present. It is the character and status of this atemporal 
perspective that makes Fa-tsang’s bodhicitta doctrine, and his thought as a 
whole, both spiritually powerful, and philosophically problematic.
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